Why Do Rebel Groups Ally and Fight? A Network Model of Wartime Cooperation and Conflict

“This article develops a relational theory of wartime cooperation and conflict and tests it on the Syrian civil war, reconstructing the inter-rebel network as a two-layer object, one layer for cooperation and one for conflict, from georeferenced event data on 77 armed groups active between 2011 and 2024. Building on accounts centered on identity, power, and territory, the theory derives four hypotheses, including a “frenemy” hypothesis that treats the coincidence of cooperation and conflict on the same dyad as a third, analytically distinct relational type rather than a residual overlap between the other two. Five complementary network models, cross-sectional and temporal exponential random graph models, a multilayer ERGM, a four-category multinomial logit, and an additive and multiplicative effects model, are estimated jointly, with agreement across their non-overlapping assumptions serving as the inferential warrant. Geographic proximity is the strongest and most consistent predictor of whether any tie exists; power operates as a node-level activity effect, with the most resourced groups forming disproportionately many ties of every kind; and ideology suppresses conflict without driving alliance, an effect concentrated early in the war. The frenemy pattern, rather than reflecting a distinct dyadic tendency, proves to be a by-product of activity concentrated on a small number of powerful hubs.”

Full paper available on request — reach out at ozturan@bc.edu.

Recommended citation: Ozturan, B. (working paper). Why Do Rebel Groups Ally and Fight? A Network Model of Wartime Cooperation and Conflict.